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The Bildungsroman and Its Significance in the History of Realism

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Lost Book Series: 2007

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Does not the threat of an atomic catastrophe which could wipe out the human race also serve to protect the very forces which perpetuate this danger? The efforts to prevent such a catastrophe overshadow the search for its potential causes in contemporary industrial society. These causes remain underdefined, unexplored, unattacked by the public because they recede before the all too obvious threat from without — to the West from the East, to the East from the West. Loyalty, obvious as the need for being prepared, for being on the alert, for facing the challenge. We submit to the peaceful production of the means of destruction, to the perfection of waste, to being educated for a defense which determines the defendors and that which they defend.

If we attempt to relate the causes of the danger to the way in which society is organized and organizes its members, we are immediately confronted with the fact that advanced industrial society becomes richer, bigger, and better as it perpetuates the danger. The defense structure makes life safer for a greater number of people and extends man's mastery of nature. Under these circumstances, our mass media have little difficulty in selling particular interests as those of all sensible men. The political needs of society become individual needs and aspirations, their satisfaction promotes business and the commonweal, and the whole appears to be the very embodiment of Reason.

that yet this society is rational as a whole, its productivity to destructive of the free development of human needs and faculties, its peace maintained by the constant threat of war, its growth dependent on the repression of the real possibilities for bettering the struggle for existence — individual, national, and international. This repression, so different from that which characterized the preceding less developed stages of our society, operates today not from a position of natural and technical immaturity but rather from a position of strength. The capabilities (intellectual and material) of contemporary society are immeasurably greater than ever before — which means that the scope of society's domination over the individual is immeasurably greater than ever before. Our society distinguishes itself by conquering the centrifugal social forces with Technology rather than Terror, on the dual basis of an overwhelming efficiency and an increasing standard of living.

To investigate the roots of these developments and examine their historical alternatives is part of the aim of a critical theory of contemporary society, a theory which analyzes society in the light of its stated and revealed or absent capabilities for improving the human condition. But what are the standards for such a critique?

Currently value judgments play a part. The established way of organizing society is measured against other possible ways, ways which are held to offer better chances for alleviating man's struggle for existence; a specific historical practice is measured against its own historical alternatives. From the beginning, any critical theory of society is thus confronted with the problem of historical objectivity, a problem which arises at the two points where the analysis implies value judgments:

1. the judgment that human life is worth living, or rather can be and ought to be made worth living. This judgment underlies all intellectual effort. It is the a priori of social theory, and its rejection rather is perfectly logical rejects theory itself.

2. the judgment that in a given society specific possibilities exist for the amelioration of human life and specific ways and means of realizing these possibilities. Critical analysis has to demonstrate the objective validity of these judgments, and this demonstration has to proceed on empirical grounds. The established society has available an ascertainable quantity and quality of intellectual and material resources. How can these resources be used for the optimal development and satisfaction of individual needs and faculties with a minimum of toil and misery? Social theory is historical theory, and history is the realm of chance in the realm of necessity. Therefore, among the various possible and actual modes of organizing and utilizing the available resources, which ones offer the greatest chance of an optimal development?

The attempt to answer these questions demands a series of critical abstractions, in order to identify and define the possibilities of an optimal development, the critical theory must abstract from the actual organization and utilization of society's resources, and from the results of this organization and utilization. Such abstraction which refuses to accept the given outcomes of facts as the final context of validation, such "transcending" analysis of the facts in the light of their avoided and denied possibilities, pertains to the very structure of social theory. It is opposed to all metaphysics by virtue of the rigorously historical character of the transcendence. The "possibilities" must be within the reach of the respective society; they must be attainable goals of practice. By the same token, the abstraction from the established is — situations must be expressions of an actual tendency that is, their transformations must be they not need of the underlying population. Social theory is concerned with the historical alternatives which haunt the established society as subversive tendencies and forces. The values attached to the alternatives do become facts when they are translated into reality by historical practice. The theoretical concepts terminate with social change.

But here, advanced industrial society confronts the critique with a situation which seems to deprive it of its very basis. Technical progress, extended to a whole system of domination and coordination, creates forms of life and of power which appear to reconcile the forces opposing this system and to defeat or refute all project in the name of the historical prospects of freedom from toil and domination. Contemporary society seems to be capable of containing social change — qualitative change which would establish essentially different institutions, a new direction of the

productive process, new modes of human existence. This containment of social change is perhaps the most singular achievement of advanced industrial society, the general acceptance of the National Purpose, bipartisan policy, the decline of ideologies, the collusion of Business and Labor within the group State, testify to the integration of opposites which is the result as well as the prerequisite of this achievement.

A brief comparison between the formative stage of the theory of industrial society and its present situation may help to show how the basic of the critique has been altered. At its origins in the first half of the nineteenth century, when it elaborated the first concepts of the alternatives, the critique of industrial society attempted concretenesses in a historical mediation between theory and practice, values and facts, needs and goals. This historical mediation occurred in the consciousness and in the political action of the two great classes which faced each other in the society: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. In the Capitalist world, they are still the basic classes. However, the capitalist development has altered the structure and function of these two classes in such a way that they no longer appear to be agents of historical transformation. The overriding interest in the preservation and improvement of the institutional status quo unites the former antagonists in the most advanced areas of contemporary society. And to the degree to which technical progress spurs the growth and cohesion of continuous society, the very idea of qualitative change recedes behind the realistic contours of a non-explosive evolution. In the absence of demonstrable agents and agencies of social change, the critique is thus thrown back to a high level of abstraction. There is no ground on which theory and practice, thought and action meet. Even the most empirical analysis of historical alternatives appears to be unrealistic speculation, and commitment to them a matter of personal or group preference.

And yet, does this absence refute the theory? In the face of apparently contradictory facts, the critical analysis continues to insist that the need for qualitative change is as pressing as ever before. Needed by whom? The answer continues to be the same: by the society as a whole, for every one of its members. The union of growing productivity and growing destruction, the

unbearability of exploitation, the surrender of thought, hope, and fear to the decisions of the powers that be, the preservation of misery in the face of unprecedented wealth constitute the most impartial indictment — even if they are not the raison d'être of this society but only its by-product. In sweeping rationality, which propels efficiency and growth, is itself irrational.

The fact that the vast majority of the population accepts, and is made to accept, this society does not render it less irrational and less reprehensible. The distinction between true and false consciousness, real and immediate interest, still is meaningful. But this distinction itself must be validated. Men must come to see it and to find their way from false to true consciousness, from their immediate to their real interest. They can do so only if they live in need of changing their way of life, of denying the positive, of refusing. It is precisely this need which the established society manages to repress to the degree to which it is capable of "delivering the goods" on an increasingly large scale, and using the scientific conquest of nature for the scientific conquest of man.

Confronted with the total character of the achievements of advanced industrial society, critical theory is left without the rationale for transcending this society. The concepts crystallize the theoretical structure itself, because the categories of a critical social theory were developed during the period in which the need for refusal and subversion was embodied in the action of effective social forces. These categories were essentially negative and oppositional concepts, defining the actual contradictions in nineteenth century European society. The category "society" itself expressed the acute conflict between the social and political spheres — society as antagonistic to the state. Similarly, "individual", "class", "activity", "family" denoted spheres and forces not yet integrated with the established conditions — spheres of beyond and contradiction. With the growing integration of industrial society, these categories are losing their critical connotations, and tend to become descriptive, descriptive or operational terms.

An attempt to recapture the critical intent of these categories, and to understand how the intent was cancelled by the social reality,

appears from the outset to be regressive from a theory joined with historical practice to abstract speculative thought, from the critique of political economy to philosophy. This ideological character of the critique results from the fact that the analysis is forced to proceed from a position "outside" the position as well as negative, the productive as well as destructive tendencies in society. Modern industrial society is the paramount identity of these opposites — it is the whole that is in question. At the same time, the position of theory cannot be one of mere speculation, it must be a historical position in the sense that it must be grounded on the capabilities of the given society.

This ambiguous situation involves a still more fundamental ambiguity. Time-dimensional lifes and vectors throughout between two contradictory hypotheses: (1) that advanced industrial society is capable of containing qualitative change for the foreseeable future, (2) that forces and tendencies exist which may break this containment and explode the society. I do not think that a clear answer can be given. Both tendencies are there, side by side — and even the one in the other. The first tendency is dominant, and whatever preconditions for a reversal may exist are being used to prevent it. Perhaps an accident may alter the situation, but unless the recognition of what is being done and what is being prevented subverts the consciousness and the behavior of men, not even a catastrophe will bring about the change.

This analysis is focused on advanced industrial society, in which the technical apparatus of production and distribution (with an increasing sector of automation) functions, not as the sum-total of mere instruments which can be isolated from their social and political effects, but rather as a system which determines a priori the product of the apparatus as well as the operations of servicing and extending it, in this society, the productive apparatus tends to become totalitarian in the sense in which it determines not only the socially needed occupations, skills, and attitudes, but also individual needs and aspirations. It thus obliterates the opposition between the private and public existence, between individual and social needs. Technology serves to institute new, more effective, and more pleasant forms of social control and social cohesion. The totalitarian tendency of

these controls seems to assert itself in still another sense — by spreading to the less developed and even to the pre-industrial areas of the world, and by creating similarities in the development of capitalism and communism.

In the face of the totalitarian features of this society, the traditional notion of the "neutrality" of technology can no longer be maintained. Technology as such cannot be isolated from the use to which it is put; this technological society is a system of domination which operates already in the concept and construction of technique. The way in which a society organizes the life of its members involves an initial choice between historical alternatives which are determined by the intellectual level of the material and intellectual culture. This choice itself results from the play of the dominant interests. It anticipates specific modes of transforming and utilizing man and nature and rejects other modes. It is one "project" of realization among others.

But once this project has become operative in the basic institutions and attitudes, it tends to become exclusive and to determine the development of the society as a whole. As a technological universe, advanced industrial society is a political universe, the latest stage in the realization of a specific historical project — namely, the experience, transformation, and organization of nature as the mere stuff of domination.

As the project unfolds, it shapes the entire universe of discourse and action, intellectual and material culture. In the medium of technology, culture, politics, and the economy merge into an omnipresent system which swallows up or repulses all alternatives. The productivity and growth potential of this system stabilizes the society and contain technical progress within the framework of domination. Technological rationality has become political rationality.

1. The New Forms of Control

A comfortable, smooth, reasonable, democratic unfreedom prevails in advanced industrial civilization, a token of technical progress. Indeed, what could be more rational than the suppression of individuality, to the mechanization of socially necessary but painful performances, the concentration of individual enterprises to more effective, more productive enterprises, the regulation of free competition among unequally equipped economic subjects, the curtailment of prerogatives and national sovereignties which impede the international organization of resources. That this technological order also involves a political and intellectual coordination may be a regrettable and yet promising development.

The rights and liberties which were such vital factors in the origins and earlier stages of industrial society yield to a higher stage of this society. They are losing their traditional rationale and content. Freedom of thought, speech, and conscience were — just as free enterprise, which they served to promote and protect — essentially critical ideas, designed to replace an obsolescent material and intellectual culture by a more productive and rational one. Once institutionalized, these rights and liberties shared the fate of the society of which they had become an integral part. The achievement cancels the premises.

To the degree to which freedom from want, the concrete substance of all freedoms, is becoming a real possibility, the

liberties which pertain to a state of lower productivity are being than former content. Independence of thought, autonomy, and the right to political opposition are being deprived of their basic critical function in a society which seems increasingly capable of satisfying the needs of the individuals through the way in which it is organized. Such a society may justly demand acceptance of its principles and institutions, and reduce the opposition to the discussion and promotion of alternative policies within the status quo. In this respect, it seems to make little difference whether the increasing satisfaction of needs is accomplished by an authoritarian or a non-authoritarian system. Under the conditions of a rising standard of living, non-conformity with the system itself appears to be socially useless, and the more so when it entails tangible economic and political disadvantages and threatens the smooth operation of the whole. Indeed, at least in so far as the necessities of life are involved, there seems to be no reason why the production and distribution of goods and services should proceed through the competitive concurrence of individual liberties.

Freedom of enterprise was from the beginning not altogether a blessing, like the liberty to work or to starve, it spelled risk, insecurity, and fear for the vast majority of the population. If the individual were no longer compelled to prove himself on the market, as a free economic subject, the disappearance of this kind of freedom would be one of the greatest achievements of civilization. The technological prerequisite of mechanization and standardization might release individual energy into a yet unchartered realm of freedom beyond necessity. The very structure of human existence would be altered: the individual would be liberated from the work world's imposing upon him alien needs and alien possibilities. The individual would be free to exert autonomy over a life that would be his own. If the productive apparatus could be organized and directed toward the satisfaction of the vital needs, its control might well be centralized; such control would not prevent individual autonomy, but render it possible.

This is a goal within the capabilities of advanced industrial civilization, the "end" of technological rationality, in actual fact. However, the contrary trend operates: the apparatus imposes its economic and political requirements for defense and expansion on labor time and free time, on the material and intellectual culture. By virtue of the way it has organized its technological base, contemporary industrial society tends to be totalitarian. For "totalitarian" is not only a descriptive political coordination of society, but also a non-democratic economico-technical coordination which operates through the manipulation of needs by vested interests. It thus precludes the emergence of an effective opposition against the whole. Not only a specific form of government or party rule makes for totalitarianism, but also a specific system of production and distribution which may well be compatible with a "pluralism" of parties, newspapers, "countervailing powers," etc.

Today political power asserts itself through its power over the machine process and over the technical organization of the apparatus. The government of advanced and advancing industrial societies can maintain and secure itself only when it succeeds in mobilizing, organizing, and exploiting the technical scientific, and mechanical productivity available in industrial civilization. And this productivity mobilizes society as a whole, above and beyond any particular individual or group interests. The brute fact that the machine's physical (only physical?) power surpasses that of the individual, and of any particular group of individuals, makes the machine the most effective political instrument in any society whose basic organization is that of the machine process. But the political chief may be removed, essentially the power of the machine is only the stored-up and projected power of man. To the extent to which the work world is construed of as a machine and mechanized accordingly, it becomes the potential basis of a new freedom for man.

Contemporary industrial civilization demonstrates that it has reached the stage at which "the free society" can no longer be adequately defined in the traditional terms of economic, political, and intellectual liberties, not because these liberties have become unsignificant, but because they are too significant to be confined within the traditional forms. But the political chief may be removed; essentially the power of the machine is only the stored-up and projected power of man. New modes of realization are needed, corresponding to the new capabilities of society.

Such new modes can be indicated only in negative terms because they would amount to the negation of the prevailing modes. Thus economic freedom would mean freedom from this economy — from being controlled by economic forces and relationships, freedom from the daily struggle for existence, from earning a living. Political freedom would mean liberation of the individuals from politics over which they have no effective control. Similarly, intellectual freedom would mean the restoration of individual thought, now absorbed by mass communication and indoctrination, abolition of "public opinion" together with its makers. The complete sound of these propositions is indicative, not of their utopian character, but of the strength of the forces which prevent their realization. The more effective and enduring form of warfare against liberation is the implanting of material and intellectual needs that perpetuate obsolete forms of the struggle for existence.

The necessity, the satisfaction and even the character of human needs, beyond the biological level, have always been preconditioned. Whether or not the possibility of being or having, enjoying or destroying, possessing or rejecting something in which or in need depends on whether or not it can be seen as desirable and necessary for the prevailing societal institutions and interests, is this survey. Surveys needs are historical needs and, to the extent to which the society demands the repressive development of the individual, the needs themselves and their claim for satisfaction are subject to overriding critical standards.

We may distinguish both true and false needs. "False" are those which are superimposed upon the individual by particular social interests in his repression: the needs which perpetuate toil, aggressiveness, misery and injustice. Their satisfaction might be most gratifying to the individual, but this happiness is not a condition which has to be maintained and protected if it serves to arrest the development of the ability (his own and others) to recognize the disease of the whole and grasp the chances of curing the disease. The result then is euphoria in unhappiness. Most of the prevailing needs to relax, to have fun, to behave and consume in accordance with the advertisements, to love and hate what others love and hate, belong to this category of false needs.

Such needs have a societal content and function which are determined by external powers over which the individual has no control; the development and satisfaction of these needs is heteronomous. No matter how much such needs may have become the individual's own, reproduced and fortified by the conditions of his existence, no matter how much he identifies himself with them and finds himself in their satisfaction, they continue to be what they were from the beginning — products of a society whose dominant interest demands repression.

The prevalence of repressive needs is an accomplished fact, accepted in ignorance and defiant, but a fact that must be undone in the interest of the happy individual as well as all those whose misery is the price of his satisfaction. The only needs that have an unqualified claim for satisfaction are the vital ones — nourishment, clothing, lodging at the attainable level of culture. The satisfaction of these needs is the prerequisite for the realization of all needs, of the unsublimated as well as the sublimated ones.

For any consciousness and conscience, for any experience which does not accept the prevailing societal interest as the supreme law of thought and behavior, the established universe of needs and satisfactions is a fact to be questioned — questioned in terms of truth and falsehood. These terms are historical throughout, and their objectivity is historical. The judgment of needs and their satisfaction, under the given conditions, involves standards of priority — standards which refer to the optimal development of the individual, of all individuals, under the optimal utilization of the material and intellectual resources available to man. The resources are calculable. "Truth" and "falsehood" of needs designate objective conditions to the extent to which the universal satisfaction of vital needs and, beyond it, the progressive alleviation of toil and poverty are universally valid standards. But as historical standards, they do not only vary according to area and stage of development, they also can be defined only in greater or lesser contradiction to the prevailing ones. What individual can possibly claim the authority of decision?

In the last analysis, the question of what are true and false needs must be answered by the individuals themselves, but only in the

bad analysis: that is, if and when they are free to give their own answer. As long as they are kept incapable of being autonomous, as long as they are indoctrinated and manipulated down to their very instincts, their answer to this question cannot be taken as their own. By the same token, however, no informed can really arrogate to itself the right to decide which needs should be developed and satisfied. Any such informed is manipulator, although our revolution does not do away with the question how can the people who have been the object of effective and productive domination by themselves create the conditions of freedom?

The more rational, productive, technical, and total the repressive administration of society becomes, the more unimaginable the means and ways by which the administered individuals might break their servitude and seize their own liberation. To be sure, to impose liberty upon an entire society is a paradoxical and scandalous idea — although one might dispute the righteousness of a society which ridicules this idea while making its own population into objects of total administration. All liberation depends on the conscious, state of servitude, and the emergence of this consciousness is always hampered by the predominance of needs and satisfactions which, to a great extent, have become the individual's own. The process always replaces one system of pre-conditioning by another; the optimal goal is the replacement of false needs by true ones, the abandonment of repressive satisfaction.

The distinguishing feature of advanced industrial society is the effective suffocation of those needs which demand liberation — liberation also from that which is tolerable and rewarding and comfortable — while it sustains and absolves the destructive power and repressive function of the affluent society. But the political trend may be reversed essentially the power. Here, the social controls extol the ever -jeopardizing need for the production and consumption of waste; the need for unjustifying work where it is no longer a real necessity; the need for modes of relaxation which soothe and prolong this unjustification; the need for maintaining such decisions liberties as free competition at administered prices, a free press which censors itself, free choice between brands and gadgets.

Under the rule of a repressive whole, liberty can be made into a powerful instrument of domination. The range of choice open to the individual is not the decisive factor in determining the degree of human freedom, but what can be chosen and what is chosen by the individual. The criterion for free choice can never be an absolute one, but neither is it entirely relative. Free election of masters does not abolish the masters or the slaves. Free choice among a wide variety of goods and services does not signify freedom if these goods and services sustain social controls over a life of toil and fear — that is, if they sustain alienation. And the spontaneous reproduction of superimposed needs by the individual does not establish autonomy. It only testifies to the efficacy of the controls.

Our resistance to the depth and efficacy of these controls is open to the objection that we overrate greatly the indoctrinating power of the "media" and that by themselves the people would feel and satisfy the needs which are now imposed upon them. This objection misses the point. The preconditioning does not start with the mass production of radio and television and with the concentration of their control. The people enter this stage as preconditioned receptacles of long standing; the decisive difference is in the flattening out of the contrast (or conflict) between the given and the possible, between the satisfied and the unsatisfied needs. Here, the so-called equalization of class distinctions reveals its ideological function. If the worker and his boss enjoy the same television program and visit the same resort places, if the typist is as attractively made up as the daughter of her employer, if the Negro owns a Cadillac, if they all read the same newspaper, then this assimilation indicates not the disappearance of classes but the extent to which the needs and satisfactions that serve the preservation of the Establishment are shared by the underlying population.

Indeed, in the most highly developed areas of contemporary society, the manipulation of social into individual needs is so effective that the difference between them seems to be purely theoretical. Can one really distinguish between the mass media as instruments of information and entertainment, and as agents of manipulation and indoctrination? Between the automobile as nuisance and as convenience? Between the horrors and the

contribute of functional architecture? Between this work for national defense and this work for corporate gain? Between this private pleasure and this commercial and political utility involved in increasing the birth rate?

We are again confronted with one of the most vexing aspects of advanced industrial civilization: the rational character of its irrationality. Its productivity and efficiency, its capacity to increase and spread comfort, to turn waste into need, and destruction into construction, the extent to which this civilization transforms the object world into an extension of man's mind and body makes the very notion of alienation questionable. The people recognize themselves in their commodities; they find their soul in their automobile, in hi-fi set, split-level home, kitchen equipment. The very mechanism which ties the individual to the society has changed, and social control is anchored in the new needs which it has produced. The prevailing forms of social control are technological in a new sense. To the sure, the technical structure and efficacy of the productive and destructive apparatus has been a major instrumentality for subjecting the population to the established social division of labor throughout the modern period. Moreover, such integration has always been accompanied by more obvious forms of compulsion: loss of livelihood, the administration of justice, the police, the armed forces. It still is. But in this contemporary period, the technological controls appear to be the very embodiment of Reason for the benefit of all social groups and interests — to such an extent that all contradiction seems irrational and all counteraction impossible.

No wonder then that, in the most advanced areas of this civilization, the social controls have been introjected to the point where even individual protest is affected at its roots. The intellectual and emotional refusal "to go along" appears neurotic and impotent. This is the socio-psychological aspect of the political event that marks the contemporary phase the passing of the historical forces which, at the prevailing stage of industrial society, seemed to represent the possibility of new forms of existence.

But the term "introjection" perhaps no longer describes the way in which the individual by himself reproduces and perpetuates the external controls exercised by his society. Introjection suggests a variety of relatively spontaneous processes by which a Self (Ego) incorporates the "Outer" into the "Inner." Thus introjection implies the existence of an inner dimension distinguished from and even antagonistic to the external imperative — an individual consciousness and an individual unconscious apart from public opinion and behavior. The idea of "inner freedom" here has its reality in designating the private space in which man may become and remain "himself."

Today this private space has been invaded and whittled down by technological reality. Mass production and mass distribution claim the entire individual, and industrial psychology has long since ceased to be confined to the factory. The manifold processes of introjection seem to be modified to almost mechanical reactions. The result is not adjustment but immediate or immediate identification of the individual with his society and through it, with the society as a whole.

This immediate, automatic identification (which may have been characteristic of primitive forms of association) happens in high industrial civilizations by way "immediacy." However, is the product of a sophisticated, scientific management and organization. In this process, the "inner" dimension of the mind in which opposition to the status quo can take root is whittled down. The loss of this dimension, in which the power of negative thinking — the critical power of Reason — is at home, is the ideological counterpart to the very material process in which advanced industrial society enhances and counteracts the opposition. The impact of progress turns Reason into submission to the facts of life, and to the dynamic capability of producing more and bigger facts of the same sort of life. The efficiency of the system blunts the individuals' recognition that it contains no facts which do not communicate the repressive power of the whole. If the individuals find themselves in the things which shape their life, they do so, not by giving, but by accepting the law of things — not the law of physics but the law of their society.

I have just suggested that the concept of alienation seems to become questionable when the individuals identify themselves with the existence which is imposed upon them and have in it

their own development and satisfaction. This identification is not illusion but reality. However, this reality constitutes a more progressive stage of alienation. The latter has become entirely objective: the subject which is alienated is swallowed up by the alienated existence. There is only one dimension, and it is everywhere and in all forms. The achievements of progress defy ideological indictment as well as justification; before their tribunal, the "false consciousness" of their rationality becomes the true consciousness.

This alienation of ideology into reality does not, however, signify the "end of ideology". On the contrary, in a specific sense advanced industrial culture is more ideological than its predecessors, inasmuch as today the ideology is in the process of production itself. In a provocative form, this proposition reveals the political aspects of the prevailing technological rationality. The productive apparatus and the goods and services which it produces "sell" or impose the social system as a whole. The means of mass transportation and communication, the commodities of lodging, food, and clothing, the irresistible output of the entertainment and information industry carry with them prescribed attitudes and habits, certain intellectual and emotional reactions which bind the consumers more or less pleasantly to the producers and, through the latter, to the whole. The products indoctrinate and manipulate; they promote a false consciousness which is immune against its falsehood. And as these beneficial products become available to more individuals in more social classes, the indoctrination they carry ceases to be publicity; it becomes a way of life. It is a good way of life — much better than before — and as a good way of life it militates against qualitative change. The common feature is a total assimilation of the treatment of concepts, their meaning is restricted to the representation of particular operations and behaviors. The operational point of view is well illustrated by P. W. Bridgman's analysis of the concept of length.

We evidently know what we mean by length if we can tell what the length of any and every object is, and for the physicist nothing more is required. To find the length of an object, we have to perform certain physical operations. The concept of length is therefore fixed when the operations by which length is measured are fixed; that is, the concept of length involves as much and nothing more than the set of operations by which length is determined. In general, we mean by any concept nothing more than a set of operations; the concept is synonymous with the corresponding set of operations.

Bridgman has seen the wide implications of this mode of thought for the society at large:

To adopt the operational point of view involves much more than a mere restriction of the sense in which we understand concepts, but means a far-reaching change in all our habits of thought, in that we shall no longer permit ourselves to use as tools in our thinking concepts of which we cannot give an adequate account in terms of operations.

Bridgman's prediction has come true. The new mode of thought is under the predominant tendency in philosophy, psychology, sociology, and other fields. Many of the most seriously troublesome concepts are being "eliminated" by showing that no adequate account of them in terms of operations or behavior can be given. The radical empiricist onslaught is dealt subsequently, in chapters VII and VIII; anyone he claim to be empirical thus provides the methodological justification for the debunking of the mind by the intellectuals — a profession which, in its denial of the transcending elements of Reason, forms the academic counterpart of the socially required behavior.

Outside the academic establishments, the "far-reaching change in all our habits of thought" is more serious. It serves to coordinate ideas and goals with those exacted by the prevailing system, to evolve them in the system, and to expel those which are irreconcilable with the system. The origin of such a one-dimensional reality does not mean that materialistic rules, and that the spiritual, metaphysical, and behavioral occupations are passing out. On the contrary, there is a great deal of "Worship together this week," "Who run my block" clubs, organizations, and book series of life, etc. But such modes of protest and transcendence are no longer contradictory to the status quo and no longer negative. They are rather the ceremonial part of practical behaviorism, its harmless negation, and are quickly

digested by the status quo as part of its healthy diet. One-dimensional thought is systematically promoted by the makers of politics and their purveyors of mass information. Their universe of discourse is populated by self-validating hypotheses which, horizontally and vertically, repeatedly become hypostatic definitions of definitions. For example, "Free" are the institutions which operate (and are operated on) in the countries of the Free World; other transcending modes of freedom are by definition either anarchism, communism, or propaganda. "Socialized" are all encroachments on private enterprise not undertaken by private enterprise itself (or by government contractors) such as universal and comprehensive health insurance, or the protection of nature from all not salvaging commercialization, or the establishment of public services which may hurt private profit. This tautologous logic of accomplished facts has its Eastern counterpart. There, freedom to the way of life instituted by a communist regime, and all other transcending modes of freedom are either capitalistic, or revisionist, or leftist-sectarianism. In both camps, non-operational ideas are non-behavioral and subversive. The movement of thought is engaged in barriers which appear as the limits of Reason itself.

Such limitation of thought is certainly not new. Recording modern rationalism, in its speculative as well as empirical form, shows a striking contrast between extensive critical indulgence in scientific and philosophic method on the one hand, and an uncritical acceptance of the attitude toward established and functioning social institutions. Thus Descartes' rigs cogitare was to mean the "great public market" unscathed, and Hobbes held that "the present ought always to be preferred, maintained, and accounted best." Hand against with Locke in justifying revolution if and when it has succeeded in organizing the efforts and in preventing subversion.

However, these accommodating concepts of Reason were always contradicted by the sordid misery and injustice of the "great public market" and the effective, more or less conscious rebellion against them. The society bears a whole type of oppositional operations and behavior. Consequently, Socrates' conditions existed which provided and permitted real dissociation, from the established state of affairs, a private as well as political

dimension was present in which dissociation could develop into effective opposition, testing its strength and the validity of its objectives. The society bears a whole type of oppositional operations and behavior. Consequently,

With the gradual closing of this dimension by the society, the self-limitation of thought assumes a larger significance. The interrelations between scientific-philosophical and societal processes, between theoretical and practical Reason, appears itself "behind the back" of the scientists and philosophers. The society bears a whole type of oppositional operations and behavior. Consequently, the concepts pertaining to them are rendered illusory or meaningless. Rational transcendence appears as metaphysical transcendence, not acceptable to science and scientific thought. The operational and behavioral point of view, practiced as a "habit of thought", at large, becomes the case of the established universe of discourse and action, needs and aspirations. The "Cunning of Reason" works, as it so often did, in the interest of the powers that be. The resistance to operational and behavioral concepts turns against the efforts to free thought and behavior from the given reality and for the suppressed alternatives. Theoretical and practical Reason, academic and social behavioralism meet on common ground: that of an advanced society which makes scientific and technical progress into an instrument of domination.

"Progress" is not a neutral term. It moves toward specific ends, and these ends are defined by the possibilities of ameliorating the human condition. Advanced industrial society is approaching the stage where continued progress would demand the radical subversion of the prevailing direction and organization of progress. From this point on, technical progress would transcend the realm of necessity, where it served as the instrument of domination and exploitation which thereby limited its rationality. Technology would become subject to the free play of faculties in the struggle for the pacification of nature and of society.

Such a state is envisioned in Marcuse's notion of the "abolition of labor." The term "pacification of existence" seems better suited to designate the historical alternative of a world which — through an international conflict which transforms and suspends the